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Gina Cora*
A lawyer was walking down the street and saw two cars smash into one
another. Rushing over, he said, "I saw everything, and I'll take either side. '
INTRODUCTION
The joke above is no laughing matter. Two cars crashed, and, presumably,
the lawyer saw who caused the accident. He rushes over to the scene but, rather
than describe what happened, offers his services to whomever pays first. The
episode draws laughs because of the attorney's unseemly disregard for conven-
tional morality. The lawyer is not there to help; he is there to make a few bucks.
The humor plays upon the anxiety we feel over the lawyer's role in administer-
ing justice. The lawyer defends whoever pays him, not whomever he believes is
right. Intuitively, we feel like this moral flexibility is wrong.
The joke's premise-the tension between legal and ordinary morality-is
the subject of two recent books. A Modern Legal Ethics' and Lawyers and Fidelity
to Law3 each justify how the lawyer, fully enmeshed in the adversarial system
and the nearly blind partisanship it requires, can remain ethical. 4 In doing so,
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 20o9; Brown University, M.A. 2005; University of
Notre Dame, B.A. 2003. The author thanks Professor Daniel Markovits and Pro-
fessor Bradley Wendel for making these materials available. She also thanks An-
drew Thomas and the Yale Law & Policy Review for their editing.
1. MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES & LEGAL CULTURE 32
(20o6) (citation omitted).
2. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008).
3. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (forthcoming 2010) (on
file with the Yale Law & Policy Review). All citations are to the manuscript's chap-
ter and section number because the page numbers will change before publication.
4. It is worth noting that both Markovits and Wendel focus on U.S. lawyers. Both
authors' arguments, however, are relevant to at least a portion of foreign and in-
ternational lawyers. Wendel's argument applies to any lawyer supporting "the
functioning of a complex institutional arrangement that makes stability, coexis-
tence, and cooperation possible in a pluralistic society." Id. at intro. Markovits's
argument applies to any lawyer working within a system in which there is a
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both Daniel Markovits and Bradley Wendel depart from the recent movement
in ethics scholarship. The traditional understanding of legal ethics is that the
adversarial process renders the lawyer's work ethical.' The literature's most re-
cent trend, however, suggests that lawyers adhering to blind client partisanship
cannot be ethical, and it calls for moderation in adversarial advocacy.6 Both
Markovits and Wendel, however, are revisionists in that they embrace the ad-
versarial process for different reasons than traditionalists. Markovits bases his
reasoning on the concept of integrity through fidelity to clients.7 Wendel roots
his theory in fidelity to legality, meaning that lawyers are ethical because they do
what the political process tells them to do.'
This Review first seeks to explain each author's argument and how it fits
into modern legal ethics scholarship. Although both authors depart from the
reformist trend, Markovits's novel argument is a deeper departure from prior
work; it admits that lawyers lie and cheat but breaks from the traditionalists'
greater good argument and redeems lawyers' ethics. A "greater good" argument
justifies the client partisanship characterizing lawyers' work as the means to a
more abstract end. Traditionally, the adversarial process would be that greater
end. Wendel, on the other hand, amends the traditionalists' argument by focus-
ing on legality-rather than the adversarial process-but still relies upon a ver-
sion of the greater good argument.
This Review's second Part discusses these theories' implications for evaluat-
ing and crafting ethics laws. Because of its focus on legality, Wendel's theory
permits evaluating ethics laws based on process inquiries only and crafting
them to regulate specific behavior. Markovits's theory, in contrast, allows more
room- for evaluating the substance of ethics laws and for crafting them to pro-
vide more general principles than specific rules. Rather than assess which prac-
tical implications are desirable, this Review's second Part highlights the impor-
tance of this question.
"structural separation between advocate and tribunal...." MARKOVITS, supra
note 2, at 15.
5. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 62-63 (1998) (stating that tradi-
tionalists justify the adversary system in various ways); see also MARKOVITS, supra
note 2, at 103 ("The dominant argument in legal ethics-especially among defend-
ers of the legal profession.. . -is the adversary system excuse."). For a typical
traditionalist account, see MONROE H. FREEMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVER-
SARY SYSTEM (1975).
6. See, e.g., ARTHUR APPLEBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES 113-35, 175-203 (1999);
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 67-103 (1988); SIMON, supra note 5, at 53-76
(1998).
7. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 103-51.
8. WENDEL, supra note 3, ch. 1, § 1.5 ("[L]egal ethics is not about 'ethics' as it is ordi-
narily conceived. Rather, it is an aspect of the political value of legality.").
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I. UNTANGLING MARKOVITS'S AND WENDEL'S ARGUMENTS
Markovits and Wendel fundamentally differ on what constitutes lying and
cheating by lawyers. This difference is critical to understanding each author's
book and this Review's argument. In this Part, I explain how, given their respec-
tive understandings of lying and cheating, each author redeems lawyers.
A. Lying and Cheating?
Both Markovits and Wendel begin with the premise that lawyers routinely
contravene ordinary morality in the course of their professional lives.9 That re-
ality is the worry behind the joke's humor and a point on which it is difficult to
disagree. If the witness to the accident were an ordinary person, he would be
under a moral obligation to tell the truth about what he saw. To do otherwise
would be to lie or cheat.
But the witness in the joke is a lawyer. If he argues that the guilty party is
innocent or obstructs the innocent party's ability to get damages, is that still ly-
ing and cheating? Wendel would say no, but Markovits would say yes. For
Wendel, when lawyers follow the law, they lie and cheat only if analyzed under
the inappropriate standard of ordinary morality.' ° For Markovits, however, ly-
ing and cheating remain lying and cheating when done in the lawyer's profes-
sional capacity; they form the roots of the lawyer's professional vices.1 Lawyers
must lie and cheat "whenever they represent clients whose causes they privately
(and correctly) believe should be defeated."' 2 Markovits recognizes that some
critics might accuse him of "unduly rigorous moralism,"'3 so he spends two
chapters mounting a stalwart defense-explaining why no ethics laws can en-
9. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 25 (explaining that lawyers "come under professional
obligations to do acts that, if done by ordinary people and in ordinary circum-
stances, would be straightforwardly immoral"); WENDEL, supra note 3, at intro.
("For any high profile legal ethics scandal, there is a way to describe the lawyers'
conduct in ordinary moral terms, leading ineluctably to the conclusion that law-
yers deserve the labels of liars, cheats, and even torturers.").
10. "[TIhis obligation of fidelity to law outweighs ordinary moral considerations,
when a lawyer is acting in a representative capacity." WENDEL, supra note 3, at in-
tro. Wendel clarifies that the "ordinary" in "ordinary morality" "is intended to
capture the idea of moral principles that apply to us simply as people, not as oc-
cupants of social roles or institutions." Id. at ch. 1, § 1.2.
11. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 25 ("[Lawyers] unfairly prefer their clients over oth-
ers and, moreover, serve their clients in ways that implicate common vices with
familiar names: most notably, lawyers lie and cheat.").
12. Id. at 66.
13. Id. at 25.
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tirely eliminate these fundamental vices from lawyers' adversarial work and why
ordinary objections on this point fail.
14
At the outset of their respective arguments, it is easier to agree with Wendel
than Markovits. At points, Markovits seems to be a little unfair to lawyers. For
an example of lying, he argues that, "although lawyers may not mislead courts
by doctoring the texts of the law, they may and indeed must mislead courts by
promoting false characterizations of these texts' meanings."' 5 Cheating, he fur-
ther contends, occurs when lawyers "bring claims that they do not believe will
succeed." 6 Markovits emphasizes that the law explicitly allows-even encour-
ages-lawyers to lie and cheat. Yet despite the law, he concludes that the law-
yers in both scenarios are lying or cheating. Even if Markovits is right, most
lawyers would bristle at these characterizations.
Wendel, in contrast, immediately aligns himself with lawyers; he introduces
his book as a response to the question of why, when there is a "large-scale
wrong," a lawyer is usually involved. 7 In other words, he admits the somewhat
unsavory reality of what lawyers do but, unlike Markovits, quickly moves past it
by "shifting the evaluative frame of reference from ordinary morality and justice
to considerations of political legitimacy."'" If the reader is a lawyer, she is drawn
to Wendel's theory because it reassures her that she is not engaging in immoral
behavior simply by practicing law. Although Markovits ultimately redeems law-
yers, the first portion of his argument may be difficult for many readers to ac-
cept.19
B. Redeeming Lawyers
How each author understands lying and cheating informs how they frame
the central questions of their books. Markovits asks whether-given that law-
yers are required to lie and cheat-their professional lives are worthy of com-
14. Id. at 25-78. Markovits argues, specifically, that "[a]lthough the law governing
lawyers includes a host of secondary rules that constrain the lies that lawyers may
tell and the ways in which they may cheat.... lawyers remain professionally obli-
gated to lie and to cheat on behalf of their clients in spite of the constraints." Id. at
77.
15. Id. at 54.
16. Id. at 61.
17. WENDEL, supra note 3, at intro.
18. Id.
19. Ironically, however, the very fact that lawyers are so eager to agree with Wendel-
rather than Markovits-may support Markovits's argument. Again, the joke
makes lawyers anxious. If lawyers really are not lying and cheating, why are they
so defensive? Perhaps it is because of the hordes of outsiders wrongly accusing
them, but the fact that lawyers are not so confident may be telling.
512
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mitment, which he takes to mean whether such a life can be well-lived. A well-
lived life means one in which the agent can form and achieve her own moral
ambitions. Wendel, on the other hand, mounts a defense of why a separate
morality rooted in legality trumps other considerations, including ordinary mo-
rality.22 If no abstraction can overcome the fact that lawyers lie and cheat,23 then
redeeming lawyers is a much more difficult endeavor. After all, if lawyers lie and
cheat according to whatever moral lens one uses, how can they possibly be ethi-
cal? This difficulty leads Markovits to develop a rich and deeply creative argu-
ment, which dramatically departs from prior scholarship. 4
1. Markovits on Integrity
After explaining lawyerly vices, Markovits focuses on lawyerly virtues. 5
One of these virtues is the adversarial lawyer's professional detachment, which
requires her to "serve rather than to judge [her] clients. '' 6 Markovits describes
this preference for the client's interests and points of view (meaning beliefs
about what is true and fair) over those of others as the virtue of fidelity. 7 In or-
der to recast client partisanship as a virtue, he draws an intriguing analogy to
John Keats's portrait of the poet's negative capability." The poet's negative ca-
20. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 1 ("If the basic task of ethics is to say how one should
live, then the basic task for a professional ethics is to explain how the actions,
commitments, and traits of character typical of the profession in question may be
integrated into a well-lived life.").
21. Markovits does not specifically define what he means by a well-lived life, but his
conception is clarified by the problem compelling him to write. "Even as modern
society depends on its lawyers to display some version of the lawyerly virtues,
modern society at the same time denies lawyers the cultural resources that they
need to fashion these virtues into their own, distinctive first-personal moral ide-
als .... "Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
22. WENDEL, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1.5 ("The remainder of this book will attempt to
sustain the claim that lawyers have a good reason to care about legal justice, but
not substantive justice. Thus, legal ethics is not about 'ethics' as it is ordinarily
conceived. Rather, it is an aspect of the political value of legitimacy.").
23. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 77 ("The contrast between the genetic structure of
adversary advocacy and the ideal of truthfulness makes plain why adversary advo-
cates must necessarily lie.").
24. Markovits acknowledges that Anthony Kronman influenced his effort to "recast[]
the professional activities that ordinary first-personal ethics calls vicious as ex-
pressions of this [lawyerly] virtue." Id. at lo; see ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
25. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 79-99.
26. Id. at 85.
27. Id. at 90.
28. Id. at 93-99.
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pability, according to Keats, allows him "to efface himself, maintaining 'no
identity' of his own, and (through this self-effacement) to work continually as a
medium." 9 Similarly, the lawyer suppresses her own identity in order "to work
continually as a mouthpiece for her client.""
Markovits's analogy to Keats's negative capability allows him to redeem the
lawyer's professional life; the adversarial lawyer can still have integrity, which is
the ability to have "a well-defined moral self-a sense of one's own distinctive
moral agency ... ."31 Traditionalist arguments justify breaches of ordinary mo-
rality because the breaches protect the adversarial system, but traditionalists do
not redeem lawyers personal integrity. Traditionalists ignore how the lawyer
feels about engaging in so much lying and cheating. 2 Markovits argues that fi-
delity and negative capability, coupled with the typical role-based redemption
of lawyers, make integrity possible.3 The role-based ideal makes the lawyer a
key figure in our political system. By viewing themselves as negatively capable
and as having an important role in society, lawyers may achieve a well-lived
life.34
2. Wendel on Legality
Wendel writes in response to John Yoo, a George W. Bush Administration
official who has argued that "the legal system ... [was] part of the problem,
rather than part of the solution to the challenges of the war on terrorism."35
Wendel argues that the law is not just instrumentally useful in achieving a cer-
tain policy goal but is what gives lawyers a reason for acting. For example, if
Bush Administration lawyers acted "directly on what they perceived to be the
public interest," could they "subvert the law by interpreting it in an implausibly
narrow manner" and engage in torture?36 Wendel argues no-not because tor-
turing a human being contravenes ordinary morality but because torturing was
29. Id. at 93 (internal citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 114.
32. Id. at 115-33.
33. Id. at 171-211.
34. "[T] his political account of the lawyerly virtue therefore provides the substantive
ideals that the formal moral argument about integrity-preserving role-based rede-
scription needs in order to succeed. It provides lawyers with substantial lawyerly
virtues that they may adopt in place of ordinary first-personal ambitions that con-
flict with their professional obligations to lie and cheat. It allows lawyers to fulfill
their professional obligations even while living a life that they endorse from the
inside, even, that is, while sustaining their integrity." Id. at 210-11.
35. WENDEL, supra note 3, at intro. (quoting John Woo, "one of the principal legal
architects of the Administration's response").
36. Id. at ch. 4, § 4.1.
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clearly illegal.37 Wendel's point is that a lawyer's ethics is rooted in legality. 38 In
other words, her work is ethical because she protects her clients' legal entitle-
ments.3 9 His theory turns on the important difference between "the law and
what someone-a citizen, judge, or lawyer-thinks ought to be done about
something, as a matter of policy, morality, prudence, or common sense. '4° Tor-
turing a human being is abhorrent to our ordinary moral sense, but, if it were
legal, Wendel's argument forces him to conclude that it is ethical for a lawyer to
assist in state-sponsored torture.
Because Wendel refocuses a lawyer's ethics from pursuing client interests to
pursuing legal entitlements, he needs to justify why such legal entitlements are
worthy of lawyers' fidelity. He argues that legal entitlements in the United States
are the collective product of a people sharing a legitimate legal system.4' The
collective product aspect of Wendel's argument is important because it empha-
sizes that laws develop "in the face of uncertainty and disagreement." 4 People
have very different notions of justice-as well as very different personal inter-
ests-so we rely on the law to resolve disagreements individuals would be un-
able to resolve on their own.43 This democratic achievement commands moral
respect, and a lawyer acts as a quasi-political official in promoting respect for
the law.
44
Although Wendel's argument is valuable to legal ethics scholarship, it is, at
its core, another version of a greater good argument. For Wendel, the greater
good is legality, not the adversarial process, which traditionalists consider the
37. Id.
38. Id. at ch. 1, § 1.1. According to Wendel, his focus on legality is what distinguishes
his argument from the "Standard Conception" of legal ethics that focuses on fi-
delity to clients' interests. Id. at ch. 1, § 1.3.
39. Id. at ch. 2, § 2.1 ("[Llegal entitlements of clients, and not clients interests, ordinary
moral considerations or abstract legal norms such as justice, should be the object
of lawyers' concern when acting in a representative capacity."). Wendel defines a
"legal entitlement" as "a substantive or procedural right, created by law, which es-
tablishes claim-rights (implying duties upon others), privileges to do things with-
out interference, and powers to change the legal situation of others, e.g., by im-
posing contractual obligations." Id. It is crucial to Wendel's argument that legal
entitlements include procedural entitlements. If they did not, then the aggressive-
ness of adversary advocacy would be in doubt. See, e.g., id. at ch. 2, § 2.2.1.
40. Id. at intro.
41. Wendel explains that a legal system is legitimate "if its citizens ought to accept the
laws it enacts, even if she disagrees with the substance of the law." Id. at ch. 3'
§ 3.1. Wendel focuses, therefore, on procedural legitimacy. Id. at ch. 3, § 3.2.2.
42. Id. at ch. 2, § 2.2.4.
43. Id. at ch. 3, § 3.2.2.
44. Id. at ch. 4.
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source of redemption.45 But the adversarial process might be described as one
aspect of legality, so Wendel merely widens the scope of the traditional greater
good argument. Focusing on legality adds a distinctive twist to the scholarship,
but it relies on the same basic logic. Wendel admits as much when he writes
that his argument is "a version of the Standard Conception.
' '46
II. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Both Markovits and Wendel develop innovative theories of legal ethics.
Neither devotes much attention to the practical implications of his argument,
but such implications are important to how we evaluate and structure laws gov-
erning lawyers. This Part seeks to demonstrate why we must make a choice be-
tween Wendel's and Markovits's theories.
47
A. Evaluating Existing Ethics Laws
Because Wendel redeems lawyers through legality, his theory limits us to
evaluating ethics laws based upon process inquiries only. Markovits's theory, in
contrast, offers more room to evaluate the substance of a law: the behavior the
law seeks to regulate. For example, consider the recently enacted Rule 502 on
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product (effective September 19, 2008) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4' The new rule forbids a lawyer from entering
into evidence any document accidentally disclosed to the opponent during dis-
covery. This rule reversed the common law approach, which allowed the oppo-
nent to make full use of disclosures.
49
How we would evaluate this change depends upon which author's theory
we believe. If we subscribe to Wendel's argument, we would say that, if Rule 502
was enacted consistent with all procedural requirements, its practical implica-
tions are irrelevant. As long as the lawyer follows the current rule, there is no
impact on the lawyer's virtue; the substance of the law is really outside the scope
of evaluation.
For Markovits, lawyerly virtue is rooted in fidelity, meaning client partisan-
ship.50 Although the new rule seems to promote fair play, a person subscribing
to Markovits's theory could say that the rule damages lawyerly ethics because it
overly limits client partisanship. Perversely, the old rule, which sanctioned
cheating, furthered the core of what makes a lawyer's work ethical. Markovits
45. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46. WENDEL, supra note 3, at ch. 1, § 1.3.
47. Of course, Markovits and Wendel are not the only two scholars to develop theo-
ries of lawyers' ethics. I only mean to indicate that their theories are incompatible.
48. FED. R. EvID. 502.
49. See, e.g., Hoy v. Morris, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 519 (1859).
50. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 27.
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does not believe that his arguments "countenance untrammeled partisanship in
lawyers,"'" but that "some partisanship-that is, legal representation by advo-
cates who are recognizably adversary and therefore expose themselves to the
lawyerly vices that render their ethics so difficult-remains essential for legiti-
macy.""2 Markovits leaves ambiguous how to define "excessive partisanship
[that] undermines the legitimacy of adjudication,"53 but Rule 502 certainly
makes advocacy less adversary in nature.
B. Restructuring the Law Governing Lawyers?
Since the American Bar Association first promulgated the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 4 the legal regime governing lawyers has become more
detailed and more threatening. The Model Rules have consistently moved away
from providing guiding principles on how to behave and toward mandating
specific behavior. Judges are also more inclined to allow private parties to sue
lawyers for a breach of ethics laws."5 Whether such trends are positive develop-
ments is not an easy question, and each author's argument provides a different
perspective on the answer.
Because the indeterminacy of law is a significant problem for Wendel's ar-
gument, his theory would seem to favor the trend toward more specific rules for
lawyers' ethics. Wendel locates lawyers' ethics in legality, which means that law-
yers are ethical because they follow the law. Following the law, however, is not
straightforward. The law-like language-is indeterminate. If different lawyers
can interpret the same law differently, then how can a legal theory be rooted in
following the law, rather than interpreting the law to favor one's client? In other
words, what does following the law actually require? Wendel addresses this cri-
tique, but the indeterminacy problem is not easily solved.
A more specific law regulating lawyers' behavior, however, provides clearer
prescriptions for behavior than a general norm. Wendel, in fact, makes the
point that indeterminacy is an insignificant problem for laws whose mean-
ings-even if not unquestionable-are very clear. It seems, therefore, that
Wendel's theory would favor the current trend in ethics laws toward specific
rules. The more specific the rule, the harder it becomes for the lawyer to inter-
pret it in light of her own or her client's particular desires.
Before discussing the implications of Markovits's argument on restructur-
ing ethics laws, one needs to understand his theory's most significant barrier:
51. Id. at 202.
52. Id. at 203.
53. Id.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT (2003).
55. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 235-36.
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the possibility of actually achieving integrity.s6 Even though the lawyer's life is
theoretically worthy of commitment, the concluding chapter argues that "integ-
rity-preserving role-based redescription is practically unavailable to contempo-
rary lawyers. 5s7 In order to recast lying and cheating as lawyerly virtues, the law-
yer must be able to withstand the barrage of criticisms from non-lawyers."8 It
takes support to withstand that criticism, and Markovits offers reasons why the
current state of the American bar is ill-suited to provide that support.5 9
Similarly, Markovits argues that expanding the legal regime to govern law-
yers' behavior-as opposed to offering guidance-jeopardizes lawyers' ability to
feel as though they are leading a well-lived life."° Creating stricter, more specific
rules sends the message that lawyers are not ethical agents and that burdensome
regulation is required to keep them honest. Markovits admits, however, that in-
creased rule specificity and greater repercussions for breaches may generate
more ethical behavior among lawyers.6' His point is really that two worthy
goals-more ethical behavior and lawyers achieving integrity-are incompati-
ble with each other.62
If one agrees with Markovits that such a tradeoff necessarily exists, then it
becomes clear why adopting a normative theory of legal ethics is practically im-
portant. Adopting Wendel's theory and its implication to create more specific
rules might generate more ethical lawyers. Adopting Markovits's theory and its
possible implication to retreat to more general guidance might create happier
lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Both authors assure lawyers that their work is ethical, but only Wendel's
theory reaches an optimistic conclusion. Wendel tells lawyers that, as long as
they follow the law, they are engaged in a noble pursuit and should be morally
satisfied with their professional life. Markovits's theory, in contrast, is quite pes-
simistic. Even if a lawyer's professional virtue can be located in lying and cheat-
ing for her client's ends, engaging in such behavior takes a significant personal
56. I do not intend "barrier" to mean an idea that jeopardizes the logic of Markovits's
argument. Rather, it means the impediment that renders his negative capability
argument difficult to achieve.
57. MARKOVITS, supra note 2, at 223.
58. Id. at 224-25 ("[Tlhe lawyer can successfully employ role-based redescription to
defend his integrity only if he continues to find the redescription persuasive even
in the face of the fact that it is rejected by others, indeed by most or all others who
are not themselves lawyers, as it inevitably will be.").
59. Id. at 214-43.
60. Id. at 233-43.
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toll. In other words, the anxiety expressed in lawyer jokes is ultimately inescap-
able. Is such a high price ever worth paying for the sake of being a lawyer? Nei-
ther of these books can answer that question; it is one for personal introspec-
tion. They do, however, begin the inquiry and offer at least some peace of mind
for those of us harboring doubts.
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